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MURPHY V KUHN:
DEFINING THE INSURANCE BROKER'S EXPOSURE TO
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS IN NEW YORK
Murphy v. Kuhn,' adjudicated on June 27, 1997, by the New York
some comCourt of Appeals, 2 is "an interesting case that should provide
3 The decision in
state."
the
across
fort to insurance agents and brokers
Murphy maintained that the state of New York, contrary to other states,
duty to
will not yet recognize that insurance brokers have a continuing
4 The court deadvise clients with regard to their insurance coverage.
between a
clined to recognize the existence of a "special relationship"
5 The court of apbroker and an insured that would impose such a duty.
peals' refusal to recognize this "special relationship" distinguishes it
from approximately twenty other states, whose courts have held that the
existence of a special relationship between insurance agent and insured
6
can result in a duty to advise.
Part 17 of this Case Comment provides a brief introduction to insurance brokers' exposure to errors and omissions lawsuits in the last
twenty years. Part Us discusses the facts and case history of Murphy v.
Kuhn. Part 119 outlines New York's1° definition and application of the
"special relationship" theory. Part IV examines how New York has ap-

1. 682 N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1997).

2. See id.
3.

Evan H. Krinick, InsuranceLaw Decisions Widely Diverse,N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20,

1997, at S18.
4. See Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 974.

5. See id. at 976.

6. See Appellant's Brief at 16-18, Murphy (No. 9138-92) (citing cases indicating
that the following 19 states have recognized the existence of the "special relationship" in
the insured/broker context: New Jersey, Minnesota, Michigan, Washington, Texas, Wisconsin, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, North Dakota, California, Arkansas, Ohio, South Dakota,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Iowa, Georgia, and Massachusetts).
7. See infra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
8. See infranotes 30-57 and accompanying text.
9. See infranotes 58-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
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plied the "special relationship" theory to the insured/broker context. Part
1
V

explores the application of the "special relationship" theory in other

states. Part VI12 of this Case Comment examines how the "continuous

treatment doctrine," a New York common law theory, has defined the
courts' posture towards the insurance "profession." Finally, Part VII13
analyzes the reasoning behind the court of appeals' decision in Murphy.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The exposure of insurance brokers to errors and omissions lawsuits

in this litigious age of professional liability has evolved dramatically
over the last twenty years.14 In the past, brokers could rely on the insur-

ance companies they represented to work out claims arising from inno5

cent errors made by brokers.' In the mid-1980s, the "hardening"' 16 of the
insurance market forced insurance brokers to seek out new companies
willing to write policies.17 Brokers, regardless of their long-term relation11. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 110-137 and accompanying text.
14. See Harry F. Brooks, Agents'and Brokers'ProfessionalLiabilit---Part
,AM.
AGENT & BROKER, Apr. 1996, at 18.
15. See id.
16. See Art Wiegel, The InsuranceCrunch, Bus. Vmw, Feb. 1987, at
33 (explaining the reason for the "hardening" of the insurance market in the mid-1980s).
Many of the current insurance problems can be traced back to the
rampant inflation at the turn of the decade. Inflated returns on investments caused companies to practice "cash flow underwriting,"underpricing their products to compete for premium dollars for investing. High interest rates from investments, rather than premiums,
covered liabilities.
Then inflation screeched to a halt. Investment rates plummeted, and
liability awards skyrocketed as America had a "litigation explosion,"
[causing insurance premiums to rise dramatically].
Id.
17.

See Brooks, supra note 14, at 18.
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ships, could no longer rely on one particular insurance company to write
policies.18 Although this situation provided new opportunities for insurance brokers, it also removed the safety net established previously by
the brokers
their long-standing insurance company counterparts,
19 whom
claims.
omissions
and
errors
settle
to
on
once relied
20
In the late 1980s, the insurance market "softened," and the previous
difficulties experienced by brokers in finding insurance companies to
write policies diminished.2 1 The market became more competitive than
ever before.22 For insurance brokers, the ability to procure insurance

coverage was no longer unique; 23 simply providing insurance was not a
distinguishing characteristic within the highly competitive brokerage

community.24 To attract clients, brokers ceased to represent themselves

25
as merely agents of insurance companies. Instead, they represented
as "insurance counselors," "risk managers," and "professionthemselves
26
als."

Due to the removal of the insurance companies' safety net, coupled
with the "professional status" brokers were awarding themselves, insur18. See id.
19. See id. ("In the past, one frequently heard that an insurance agent did not have
to worry about errors or omissions because, if one represented a 'good' insurer, any problems would be worked out with the help of the carrier.").
20. See Matt Roush, Plummeting Stocks May Boost Premiums, CRAiNS DETROIT
Bus., Sept. 8, 1997, at 12 (distinguishing between a "hard" and "soft" insurance market).
"Traditionally, insurance has veered sharply between 'soft' markets, marked by heavy
price competition in attempts to grab market share, and 'hard' markets, which occur
when insurance companies begin losing big on cheap policies and then suddenly boost
premiums and tighten conditions." Id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Lee Ann Gjertsen, Broker: Excess & Surplus Market Must Keep Adapting,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAsUALTY-RiSK & BENEFrrs MGMT., Sept. 15, 1997, at 19
(explaining that many brokers become "niche" or "specialty" brokers to remain competi-

tive).
24. See id.
25. See Brooks, supra note 14, at 18.
26. See id.
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ance brokers suddenly faced professional liability lawsuits usually enter-

tained by doctors, lawyers, accountants, architects, and engineers.2 7
Courts nationwide have not reached a consensus on the issue of whether
a broker may be held liable for failing to advise a client under a special
relationship theory.28 Murphy v. Kuhn 29 represents New York's control-

ling decision on this issue.
II.

THE FACTS AND CASE HISTORY OF MURPHY v KUHN

Murphy v. Kuhn involved a serious automobile accident that took

place in 1991.30 Plaintiff Thomas Murphy's ("Murphy") son was in-

volved in the accident, which resulted in the death of one person. 3 1 Murphy's son's automobile insurance was covered under Murphy's commer-

cial automobile liability policy, which was provided by defendant Don

Kuhn's ("Kuhn") insurance brokerage.32 The policy was written by The
Hartford Insurance Company ("Hartford"), which provided a limit of
$250,000 per person and a $500,000 policy aggregate per accident.3 3 Although Hartford paid the $500,000 aggregate limit on behalf of Murphy,
Murphy had to borrow an additional $194,429 above Hartford's payment
to settle the damaged parties' claims and pay $7,500 in legal fees.34
27. See When Professional Liability Coverage Is Appropriate, PUB. LIABILITY,
Dec. 1996 (identifying that doctors and lawyers are generally exposed to "professional
liability" lawsuits, while accountants, architects, and engineers have been sued for "errors

and omissions").

28. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 6, at 16-18, Murphy (No. 9138-92) (outlining
case law from many states, both supporting and denying allegations that a broker can
assume a duty to advise via a special relationship).
29. 682 N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1997).
30. See id.at 973.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.Insurance Dictionary defines "aggregate limit" as "the maximum benefit to be paid on a property and casualty policy, or under a health insurance policy, either
per occurrence or for the entire policy. Upon reaching that limit, the policy terminates."
INSuRANcE DICTnONARY 9 (Michael C. Thomsett ed., 1991).
34. See Murphy v. Kuhn, 682 N.E.2d 972, 973 (N.Y. 1997).
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Murphy brought this action against Kuhn to recover the money he
borrowed to settle the claims and pay legal fees. 35 Murphy had characterized Kuhn as "an 'insurance consultant' providing 'complete insurance
service.' 3 6 Accordingly, Murphy contended that Kuhn's business included assessing an insured's exposure to loss, and thereafter providing
such loss. 37
adequate insurance coverage to protect the insured against
Murphy's reliance on Kuhn as his insurance professional evolved from
their long-standing relationship. 38 Kuhn provided Murphy with insurance
39
for his two golf courses (Webster Golf Course) since 1957, and provided Murphy with personal insurance since the early 1970s.40 According to Murphy's testimony, the two met annually to discuss and "reassess
the insurance coverage situation for both golf courses [and] to make sure
there were no gaps in the coverage." 41 In Murphy's own words, "[the]
Kuhn Agency had handled the insurance-the club's insurance-for
them.' 4 2
years, they knew what our liability was and we trusted
Kuhn's description of his relationship with Murphy de-emphasized
Murphy's claimed dependence on Kuhn in his capacity as an insurance
professional. 43 According to Kuhn, in the twelve years prior to the date
of the automobile accident, he and Murphy never met to discuss Murphy's insurance matters. 44 In fact, "[a]t no time prior to March, 1991 did
either Mr. Murphy... or anyone else from Webster Golf Course request
on the commercial automobile policy, nor
an increase in liability limits
4 5 coverage. ' " 6
umbrella
did anyone request
35. See id.
36.

Appellant's Brief at 6, Murphy (No. 9138-92).

37. See id.
38. See id. at 7.

39. See Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 4, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
40. See Appellant's Brief at 7, Murphy (No. 9138-92).

41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 7.
43. See Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 9-10, Murphy (No. 9138-92).

44. See id. at 9.
45. Insurance Dictionary defines "umbrella policy" as "a business liability policy
that offers protection above the policy limits of other, existing policies. The purpose is to
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Murphy's claim for recovery was based on the theory that a "special
relationship" can and did develop between himself and Kuhn.4 7 Such a
"special relationship," if developed, gives rise to a duty to
advise on the
part of the broker who is being relied upon in a professional capacity. 48
Murphy specifically contended that the long, continuing course of business between himself and Kuhn "generat[ed] special reliance and an affirmative duty to advise with regard to appropriate or additional coverage."49
Kuhn argued that the well-settled common law principle mandated
that insurance brokers have a duty of reasonable care to the insured.50
This duty requires obtaining the requested coverage within a reasonable
time after a request, or informing the insured of the broker's inability to
do so; the broker, however, owes "no continuing duty to advise, guide, or
direct" the insured to obtain additional coverage.51 Kuhn also argued
against the finding of a "special relationship" on the ground that no such
relationship has ever been recognized in New York between an insurance
broker and an insured5 2 Based on these two common law arguments,
Kuhn sought dismissal, via summary judgment, of Murphy's claim for
damages.5 3
The supreme court issued summary judgment in favor of Kuhn at the
trial level, finding no question of fact with regard to the existence of a
"special relationship" between Murphy and Kuhn.5 4 On appeal,
the supreme court, appellate division, affirmed. 5 Before the court of appeals,
protect against losses that are uncovered in standard contracts." INsuRANcE DICrIONARY
216-17 (Michael C. Thomsett ed., 1989).
46. Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 10, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
47. See Appellant's Brief at 11-15, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
48. See Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
49. Murphy v. Kuhn, 682 N.E.2d 972, 974 (N.Y. 1997).
50. See Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 12, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
51. Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 974 (emphasis added).
52. See Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 21, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
53. See Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 973.
54. See id. at 974.
55. See id. at 973.
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Murphy argued that, because a jury properly instructed on the elements
of a "special relationship" could find that Kuhn assumed a duty to advise, both lower courts erred in granting the defendants' motion for
judgment. 6 The court of appeals decided in favor of defendant
summary
57
Kuhn.
NEWYORK'S DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF THE
m11.
"SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"

The general rule summarizing the common law duty owed by a broker to an insured was pronounced in Wied v. New York Central Mutual
FireInsuranceCo. 58 In Wied, the court stated that:
[u]nder New York law, an insurance agent has a duty to the customer to obtain the requested coverage within a reasonable time
after the request or to inform the customer of the agent's inability to do so, but the agent owes no continuing duty to advise,
59
guide or direct the customer to obtain additional coverage.
Contrary to New York's general rule, the courts of approximately
twenty states have recognized that although brokers have no common
law duty to advise their insureds, they may assume such a duty through a
special relationship of trust and confidence, where the insured reasonably
relies on the agent for advice. 60 The seminal case outlining this special
relationship is Hardt v. Brink. I In Hardt,the United States District Court
in Washington, applying Washington state substantive law, stated: "This
is an age of specialists and as more occupations divide into various spe-

56. See Appellant's Brief at 14, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
57. See Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 973.
58. 618 N.Y.S.2d 467 (3d Dep't 1994).
59. Id. at 468 (citing Envig v. Edward F. Cook Agency, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65
(2d Dep't 1991)).
60. See Appellant's Brief at 16-18, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
61. See Hardtv. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
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cialties and strive towards 'professional' status the law requires an even
higher standard of care in the performance of their duties." 62 The court
held that the defendant/broker was under a duty to advise the insured as
to its potential liability in the context of the insured's business, and to
recommend insurance accordingly. 63 The court so held because the broker held himself out as a highly skilled insurance advisor, and the insured
64
relied on the broker's advice.
Although New York has not recognized the existence of an assumed
special relationship in the broker/insured context, it has recognized such
a relationship in other contexts. For example, in Cuffy v. City of New
York, 65 the court of appeals outlined the following four elements of a
special relationship between a municipality and the claimant:
1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who
was injured; 2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's
agents that inaction could lead to harm; 3) some form of direct
contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party;
and 4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.66
In Florencev. Goldberg 7 the court of appeals recognized that a municipality could be held liable for a breach of duty to a particular person
68
or class of persons:
[T]o sustain liability against a municipality, the duty breached

62.
1959)).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 881 (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 299A (Tentative Draft No. 4,
See id. at 882.
Seeid.at881.
505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1987)
Id. at 940.
375 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1978).
See id.at 767.
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must be more than a duty ow[ed] to the general public. There
must exist a special relationship between the municipality and
the plaintiff, resulting in the creation of 'a duty to use due69care
of persons[.]'
for the benefit of particular persons or classes
The court of appeals concluded that "a municipality whose police
department voluntarily assumes a duty to supervise school crossings the
assumptions of that duty having been relied upon by parents of school
.... 70
children may be held liable for its negligent omission
In Kimmell v. Schaefer,71 the court of appeals recognized the existence of a special relationship in the context of commercial transactions.72 In Kimmell, the court found that the defendant had negligently
misrepresented the company in which he solicited the plaintiff to invest.73 The court stated that "liability for [a] negligent misrepresentation
has been imposed only on those persons who possess unique or specialized expertise, or who are in a special position of confidence and trust
with the injured party such that reliance on the negligent misrepresentation is justified." 74
special relationships to exThe courts of New York have also found
75 engineers and home buyers;76
agents;
travel
and
consumers
ist between
77
and tour operators and their tour participants.

69. Id. at 766 (quoting Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637 (N.Y.
1965)).
70. Id. at 765.
71. 675 N.E.2d 450 (N.Y. 1996).
72. See id.at 451.
73. See id. at 454-55.
74. Id. at 454.
75. See Pellegrini v. Landmark Travel Group, 628 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (City Ct. Westchester County 1995).
76. See Ricciardi v. Frank, 620 N.Y.S.2d 918 (City Ct. Westchester County 1994).
77. See Cohen v. Heritage Motor Tours, 618 N.Y.S.2d 387 (2d Dep't 1994).
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IV. NEW YoRK'S APPLICATION OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" IN
THE BROKER/INSURED CONTEXT

Having established that New York law recognizes the existence of a
"special relationship," the question then becomes why New
York does
not extend the recognition of this relationship to the insurance broker/insured context, as the Washington District Court did in Hardt v.
7
Brink? 8
The seminal case in New York regarding the application of a special
relationship theory in the broker/insured context is Blonsky v. Allstate
Insurance CO.79 In Blonsky, defendant broker Samuel Feldman Brokerage Corporation was sued by an insured for negligence and malpractice.80 The court of appeals held that "an insurance broker, in his capacity
as an insurance broker, may be sued only for failing to do what he is required to do."81 Extending the court's logic, it therefore follows that an
insurance broker may not be sued for failing to advise, guide, or direct an
insured's coverage after he has complied with the insured's request to
procure specific insurance.
New York courts have continued to follow the recedent established
in Blonsky. In Erwig v. Edward F. Cook Agency, 2 the supreme court,
appellate division, stated that:
[w]hile an insurance broker acting as an agent of its customer
has a duty of reasonable care to the customer to obtain the requested coverage within a reasonable time after the request, or to
inform the customer of the agent's inability to do so, the agent
owes no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct the customer

78. 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
79. 491 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985).
80. See id. at 896.
81. Id. at 897.

82. 570 N.Y.S.2d 64 (2d Dep't 1991).
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83
insured to obtain additional coverage.

Similar holdings were reached in Harnish v. Joseph J. Naples & Associ85
ates, Inc.84 and Rogers v. Urbanke. Both cases cited Erwig and Blonsky.
The New York case that most clearly denies the application of a special relationship theory to the broker/insured relationship is Wied v. New
86
York CentralMutual Fire Insurance Co. In Wied, the plaintiff, an insured, presented case law from other states that held that an insurance
a
broker has an affirmative duty to advise an insurance customer where
87 To
special relationship exists between the broker and the customer.
clarify this issue in New York, the supreme court, appellate division,
held:
[N]o New York case has gone as far in this respect as the out-ofState cases relied on by [the New York] Supreme Court. In New
York, the duty owed by an insurance agent to an insurance customer is ordinarily defined by the nature of the request a customer makes to the agent. Under New York law, an insurance
agent ... owes no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct the
88
customer to obtain additional coverage.

83. Id. at 65 (citing Blonsky v. Allstate Ins. Co., 491 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1985)).
84. 581 N.Y.S.2d 504, 504 (4th Dep't 1992) (holding that defendant/broker had no
duty either to obtain replacement coverage or to advise, guide, and direct the insured to
obtain coverage).
85. 599 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698 (3d Dep't 1993) (holding that defendant/broker had no
duty to "advise, guide or direct plaintiffs to obtain coverage other than that requested").
86. 618 N.Y.S.2d 467 (3d Dep't 1994).

87. See id. at 468.
88. Id.
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OTHER STATES' APPLICATION OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"
THEORY TO THE INSURED/BROKER RELATIONSHIP

Although New York courts have refused to recognize that an
insurance broker can assume a duty to advise via a special relationship,
other
states have found such a relationship pursuant to the Hardt
ruling.
In
Bicknell v. Havlin,89 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts ruled
that the
defendant insurance broker made many recommendations over
a considerable period of time, "and that these were 'special circumstances
of assertion, representation and reliance' for which [defendant] may
be liable. ' 9°
The North Dakota Supreme Court set the standard for a special
relationship between an insurance broker and an insured in Rawlings
v.
Fruhwirth.91 The court stated:
[I]t is apparent that something more than the standard policyholder-insurer relationship is required in order to create a question of fact as to the existence of a 'special relationship' obligating the insurer to advise the policyholder about his or her insurance coverage. There must be, in a long-standing relationship,
some type of interaction on a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the insurance agent to the in92
sured's detriment.
In Bruner v. League GeneralInsurance Co. ,93 the Michigan Court
of
Appeals held that "[a] duty to advise may arise when a 'special
relationship' exists between the insurance company or its agent and the
policyholder. Where such a duty has been breached, liability may
be based
89. 402N.E.2d 116 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
90. Id. at 119 (quoting Rapp v. Lester L. Burdick, Inc., 146 N.E.2d
368, 371

(Mass. 1957)).

91. 455 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1990).
92. Id. at 578 (quoting Bruner v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 416 N.W.2d
318, 321
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987)).
93. 416 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
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thereon."
VI.

94

THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE: NEW YORK'S REFUSAL
TO VIEW INSURANCE BROKERS AS "PROFESSIONALS"

The refusal of New York courts to recognize an insurance broker's
duty to advise may be better understood in the context of the continuous
treatment doctrine.95 By applying this doctrine, New York courts have
made it clear that insurance brokers are not regarded as "professionals"
96
architects, and accountants.
in the same manner as are doctors, lawyers,
The policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine seeks to maintain the physician/patient relationship in the belief that the most efficient
treatment can only be attained if the initial physician remains on the case
from start to cure.97 The doctrine allows the statute of limitations for a
malpractice claim to accrue at the end of the continuous treatment, between doctor and patient, if the treatment has been for the same injury
98
out of which the claim for malpractice arose.
While the continuous treatment doctrine had usually been applied
other
against physicians, New York courts have extended the doctrine to 99
At
accountants.
and
architects,
professional fields, including attorneys,
treatment
continuous
least one lower court in New York has extended the
94.

Id. at 320.

95. See Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653 (Del. 1987). The continuous treatment doctrine establishes that the statute of limitations for a malpractice claim, by a patient against
a treating physician, does not begin to run until the period of treatment is over. See id. at
659. The intent of the doctrine is to prevent termination of the patient/physician relationship so that the patient can initiate a malpractice suit within the statute of limitations. See
id. at 659-60.

96. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088,
1098 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
97. See Ewing, 520 A.2d at 659-60.
98. See Holdridge,440 F. Supp. at 1098.
99. See id. at 1098; see also Siegel v. Kranis, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1968)
(attorneys); County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 358 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct.
Broome County 1974) (architects); Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d 122
(Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1973) (accountants).
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doctrine beyond the area of malpractice actions against "professionals." 100 For example, in Colpan Realty Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co.,' 0 ' the supreme court applied the continuous treatment doctrine
to an action brought by an insured against its insurer.10 2 The court's decision indicates, however, that New York does not consider insurance providers as "professionals" in the same sense that physicians, attorneys,
architects, and accountants are considered professionals.10 3
The supreme court reiterated this distinction in Flora's Card Shop,
Inc. v. PaulKrantz & Co., Inc. 104 In this case, the court refused to apply
the continuous treatment doctrine against an insurance broker who failed
to procure riot and civil commotion coverage for their insured. 5 The
court articulated the difference among professionals by stating that "the
surface analogy between the doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect on one
hand and the insurance broker on the other hand breaks down upon
closer scrutiny. The trust reposed in the insurance broker is a business
trust as contrasted with a professional trust.', 10 6
New York's refusal to recognize insurance brokers as "professionals," in the same manner that doctors, lawyers, architects, and accountants have been viewed as "professionals," does not justify the court of
appeals' denial that a special relationship may develop between an insurance broker and an insured. After all, municipalities, 0 7 travel agents, 08
and tour operators' 0 9 can hardly be recognized as "professionals" within
the parameters of Flora's Card Shop, yet the courts in New York have
100.
101.

See Holdridge,440 F. Supp. at 1098.
373 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1975).
102. See id.at 805.
103. See Holdridge,440 F. Supp. at 1098.
104. 445 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981), aff'd, 458 N.Y.S.2d
880 (1st
Dep't 1983).
105. See id.at 393.
106. Id.
107. See Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1978).
108. See Pellegrini v. Landmark Travel Group, 628 N.Y.S.2d 1003
(City Ct.
Westchester County 1995).
109. See Cohen v. Heritage Motor Tours, 618 N.Y.S.2d 387 (2d Dep't
1994).
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extended the special relationship theory to claims against individuals in
these fields.
VII.

CONCLUSION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S
REASONING IN MURPHY

The Murphy opinion stated that "[a]s a matter of law, this record
does not rise to the high level required to recognize the special relationship threshold that might superimpose on defendants the initiatory advisement duty, beyond the ordinary placement of requested insurance
responsibilities."' 10 The court specifically refuted application of a special
relationship in the broker/insured context by not recognizing a justified
1
reliance of Murphy on Kuhn.' 1In other words, the court did not find one
of the elements needed to create a special relationship pursuant to
Cuffy." 2 The court stated, "[T]here is no indication that Murphy ever
inquired or discussed with Kuhn any issues involving the liability limits
personal ''indifference
13
of the automobile policy. Such lack of initiative or reliance."
justifiable
or
recognizable
legally
as
cannot qualify
This conclusory statement made by the court exhibits circular reasoning. The record indicates that Murphy made the following statement
summarizing his reliance on Kuhn as his insurance broker: "[T]he Kuhn
years,
Agency had handled the insurance-the club's insurance-for
1 4 If Murphy
they knew what our liability was and we trusted them."
knew nothing about insurance, and if his statement on the record is indicative of his reliance on Kuhn, why would he ever inquire about the
specifics of his policy? Would a patient inquire as to which procedure
her doctor was planning to use in upcoming surgery? Would a client inquire as to which cases her attorney was relying on for trial? Would a
client inquire as to which accounting principles her accountant was using

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Murphy v. Kuhn, 682 N.E.2d 972, 975 (N.Y. 1997).
Seeid.
Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1987).
Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 975 (emphasis added).
Appellant's Brief at 7, Murphy (No. 913 8-92).

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

to complete her tax returns? If a client of any professional asserts that she
has relied on that professional to do his job, the fact that the client
did not
inquire into the specifics of how that professional was actually doing
the
job should not be used to negate justifiable reliance. It was Murphy's
failure to inquire into the specifics of how Kuhn determined his
level of
insurance coverage, however, that the court pointed to in negating
Murphy's claim of justifiable reliance on Kuhn.' 5 Thus, the court
did not
find the existence of a special relationship." 6
The Murphy decision is also heavily weighted with policy considerations. Fearful of opening the floodgates of litigation, the court
distinguished the insurance profession from other professions by maintaining
that "[i]nsureds are in a better position to know their personal assets
and
abilities to protect themselves more so than general insurance
agents or
brokers .... 17 The court then relied on various policy arguments
outlined in Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. McCarthy. 1 8 In Farmers,
the
Missouri Court of Appeals itemized the following policy arguments
supporting their decision not to impute a duty to advise on the part
of insurance brokers:
1. [I]mposing liability on insurers and their agents "would remove any burden from the insured to take care of his own financial needs.. .";119
2. [I]mposing such a duty would transform insurance companies from a competitive marketplace industry "into ...
guardians of the insured. .. ;120

115. See Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 975.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 976.

118. See id. (describing Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d
82, 85
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).
119. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct.
(citing Dubreuil v. Allstate Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 300, 302 (R.I. 1986) (quotingApp. 1994)
Gibson v.
Govt. Employees Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 441,451-52 (1984))).
120. Id. (quoting Dubreuil,511 A.2d at 302).
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3.

[I]nsureds know their personal assets and abilities to pay better than an insurance agent. Therefore, it should be their responsibility to advise the agent of the insurance they want
121

4. [I]mposing such liability on the insurance industry would
subject insurance companies to liability for failing to advise
their own customers of every possible insurance option
available through the company.. ;122 and,
5. [B]y creating such a duty insureds would have the opportunity to seek coverage for a loss after it occurred merely by
have bought additional coverage if
asserting that they would
123
offered.
been
had
it
It is the court's consideration of the Farmers policy arguments that
led to their decision not to extend the special relationship theory to the
broker/insured context. 124 Whether Murphy actually relied on Kuhn as
his insurance professional is a question of fact. The record does not clarify the exact nature of Murphy and Kuhn's business relationship. According to Murphy, the two men met annually to "reassess the insurance
coverage situation for both golf courses [and] to make sure there were no
gaps in [the] coverage." 125 A jury may have viewed this annual meeting
as one at which Murphy was consulting with his insurance professional,
who was acting in an advisory capacity. On the other hand, Kuhn's testwo men had
timony was quite to the contrary. According to Kuhn, the
126
not met for several years to discuss Murphy's insurance. Without any
interaction regarding Murphy's insurance, a jury may have found that
Kuhn had not acted in an advisory capacity. In any event, the nature of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 86.
See Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 976.
Appellant's Brief at 6, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
See Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 9, Murphy (No. 9138-92).
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Kuhn's relationship with Murphy was a question of fact that should have
been examined by a jury. By objectively declaring that there was no justifiable reliance by Murphy on Kuhn, and therefore no creation of a special relationship as a matter of law, the court engaged in circular reason-

ing.
Further, the Murphy decision has left open the question of whether
insurance brokers should be regarded as "professionals.' '127 Although
other states recognize that an insurance broker and client can enter into a
"special relationship" whereby the broker assumes
a duty to advise, and
although New York recognizes the existence of the "special relationship"
in other "non-professional" fields, the New York courts have not extended this theory to insurance brokers. 1 28
Finally, the Murphy court hinted that one of three "exceptional"
situations might justify imputing a duty of advisement on the insurance
broker in New York. 129 These situations are: 1) if "the agent receives
compensation for consultation apart from payment of the premiums;"' 130
2) if there were "some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with
the insured relying on the expertise of the agent;', 131 or 3) if there were "a
course of dealing over an extended period of time which would have put
objectively reasonable insurance agents *on notice that their advice was
being sought and specially relied on.' ' 132 Because the court did not find
the existence of any of the above "exceptional" situations, it did not determine when the special relationship theory may apply in the insurance
33
context.1
Based on the court of appeals' discussion regarding "exceptional"
situations,13 4 there may be an increased likelihood that the special rela127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Murphy, 682 N.E.2d at 976.
See id.
See id. at 975-76.
Id. at 975.
Id.
Id. at 975-76.
See id. at 976.

134. See id. at 975-76.
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tionship theory will apply to brokers in New York. The market conditions of the insurance industry are forcing brokers to solicit clients by
35
expanding on the products and services they offer.1 Insurance companies, partly because of the excellent condition of the stock market, are
then able to rely on their investment income, more so than the premiums
136
they generate from writing insurance policies, to stimulate profits. Because insurance policies are being written so inexpensively, insurance
brokers are finding it necessary to: 1) offer consulting-type services to
their clients; and 2) charge service fees to compensate for the lack of incoming commission-a direct result of inexpensive insurance prod.ucts.1 37 This turn of events may present itself in a lawsuit in the near future, at which time it is quite probable that New York courts will decide
whether situations involving insurance brokers may qualify as "exceptional."
Joel Sulkes*

135. See Carolyn Hirsehman, FourP&C Insurers Buck Down Trend, Bus. FIRSTCOLUiBUS, June 24, 1991, at 1.
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